Always Watching: Flock Cameras in Rock Island
- Atticus Garrison
- 5 hours ago
- 17 min read
ALPR/Flock Cameras in Rock Island
My name is Atticus Garrison. I'm a Rock Island resident and a librarian whose work focuses on information systems, digital literacy, and artificial intelligence. Over the past several months, I've been following the City of Rock Island's use of Flock Safety automated license plate reader cameras, the 21 cameras currently installed around the edges of our city. After my initial episode on the Rock Island Line Podcast, I became much more attuned and aware of local politics and wanted to use my expertise in this matter to become more engaged and to hopefully lend a unique perspective to the issue that Rock Island residents might not come across in other places. I'm writing this piece because I think more Rock Island residents deserve to know what these cameras actually do, what the City has done in managing them, and what about this technology genuinely worries me.
I want to be clear upfront: the concerns I'm raising here are not about the Rock Island Police Department. Based on the policy documents I've reviewed and conversations that I have had with city officials, RIPD has taken meaningful steps to use this technology as responsibly as possible. Our police department has taken steps that many departments across the country have not taken with restricting and monitoring the use of these ALPR Flock cameras. Thus, many of my concerns lie with the vendor, Flock Safety, and about what it means for any city to participate in the nationwide surveillance network that Flock has built. Those are different questions, and this piece tries to keep them clearly separate.
What are Flock Cameras?
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) cameras are a mixture of cameras and algorithmically-driven software that automatically capture, analyze and store a wide range of data and then compare that collected data against databases of collected data to create alerts and to create records of activity.¹ ALPR cameras are typically installed at places such as traffic lights, telephone poles, the entrances of facilities or businesses, or freeway exit ramps, among other locations.
These cameras are NOT like other traffic cameras that will snap a picture or start recording in response to an inciting incident (such as speeding past the camera). ALPR cameras are always filming, every single vehicle or person that passes in front of the camera is logged and scanned by their AI VLM (Visual Language Model) that is searchable both by the company running the cameras and the police departments that contract with that company.²
That data doesn't just sit on the camera. It's transmitted to Flock Safety's servers, where it becomes part of a searchable database. Officers in departments that contract with Flock can query that database in plain language. A search isn't limited to a license plate number. Using the platform's AI-driven features, a user can search for something like "blue sedan with a roof rack" or "white pickup with front-end damage" across the cameras and time windows they have access to, and the system returns every vehicle matching that description that any camera on the network recorded. That capability is why Flock markets these as more than license plate readers. The plate is one data point among many, and the AI layer is what turns the camera network into a searchable surveillance system rather than a passive logging tool.
Flock Safety owns the platform. The City of Rock Island does not own these cameras, the software that runs them, or the network they're part of. The City licenses access to Flock's system. The Rock Island Police Department uses an interface Flock provides, operating within features Flock builds, on cameras Flock maintains, feeding data into databases Flock hosts.
It's worth addressing a point of potential confusion here, because Flock's contracts make a specific claim that's often cited in defense of the arrangement: that the contracting police department "owns the data." In a narrow sense, that's true, the contract assigns ownership of the footage and license plate reads captured by the cameras to the local department. But ownership of footage is not the same as control over the platform. The department owns its stored data in the way a customer "owns" their photos stored in a cloud service: the underlying file may belong to them, but the company hosting, processing, indexing, and building features on top of that data controls everything about how it actually functions. Flock is the one running the AI that makes the data searchable. Flock is the one connecting one city's cameras to the national network. Flock is the one developing new tools, including, as we'll discuss, tools designed to link license plate data to individual identities. The department's ownership of its specific reads doesn't change any of that.
The practical result is that the department sees what the platform lets it see and can do what the platform lets it do. It does not have visibility into the full system. How Flock uses the aggregated data from all its jurisdictions, what features are being developed on top of that data, or how access is granted or revoked at the platform level.
What is the Current State of Flock Cameras in Rock Island?
Have I been Flocked Audit of publicly available records of RIPD Flock Searches
The City of Rock Island currently operates 21 Flock Safety cameras at fixed locations around the perimeter of the city, positioned at points where vehicles enter and exit. These are not cameras placed explicitly near schools, places of worship, healthcare facilities, or specific neighborhoods. The system is operated by the Rock Island Police Department under a written policy that governs how the cameras may be used, who has access, and what restrictions apply. Data captured by Rock Island's cameras is stored for 30 days and then automatically purged unless it has been preserved for an active investigation or court proceeding. Officers are required to associate any search of the system with a case number and a documented reason, and the department conducts regular audits of search activity for compliance.
Rock Island's cameras are part of a regional network shared with neighboring law enforcement agencies. On the Illinois side of the river, Rock Island shares access with Moline, East Moline, Silvis, Milan, Coal Valley, and the Rock Island County Sheriff's Office. Across the river, access is shared with Davenport, Bettendorf, and Eldridge. Beyond those neighboring departments, Rock Island has restricted broader access. Flock Safety's previously mentioned "National Lookup" feature has been disabled for all out-of-state and federal agencies, with the exception of those three Iowa-side Quad Cities departments. State law provides additional restrictions: under the Illinois TRUST Act³ no Illinois police department may participate in civil immigration enforcement, and the Illinois Vehicle Code specifically prohibits the use of ALPR systems for immigration or reproductive healthcare-related investigations. Department policy further specifies that the system cannot be used on private property, for personal reasons, or to harass or intimidate any person or group.
It's worth noting that all of these restrictions describe one specific question: which other law enforcement agencies can access Rock Island's data, and under what conditions. They don't describe the relationship between the City and Flock Safety itself. As established earlier, Flock owns and operates the platform on which all of this runs. The cameras, the software, the databases, and the network connecting them. The access controls a department can configure are settings within a system Flock built and continues to develop. That distinction will matter for the concerns the rest of this piece outlines.
What is the big deal with Flock Cameras?
ALPR cameras have existed in various forms over the last 20+ years and have been a tool that has been employed by law enforcement for solving crimes such as car theft, AMBER alerts and missing persons cases. Flock Safety is a corporation that has taken the building blocks of how ALPR cameras operate and have expanded their capabilities across the country to create a nationwide network of cameras powered by VLM software that can facilitate nationwide searches across its network of over 80,000 cameras.⁴ On top of developing this nationwide network of cameras for license plate reading, Flock has also worked at creating parallel surveillance systems such as Nova whose explicit design purpose is to “jump from LPR [license plate reader] to person,”⁵ The pitch behind Nova was that it would collate data from sources outside of the Flock network of cameras such as data acquired through data breaches, bought from data brokers as well as public records.⁶ This culmination of 20+ sources of data, some, like the data breach data, obtained through legally dubious means shows a consolidation of data from a wide range of sources and an ability to search through that data that leads to concerning outcomes that have serious implications for, not just privacy rights but for chilling of freedom of speech across the country.
Typically, this kind of invasive searching is reserved behind search warrants and would not be able to be obtained without probable cause, but because of our lack of Federal data privacy laws in America, private companies are allowed to acquire, collect, collate, package and sell this data to private and law enforcement entities without much restriction.⁷ We have already seen instances of this ALPR technology used for concerning political purposes such as observing attendees of gun shows,⁸ surveil activists at protests,⁹ and even keep a log of attendees at events like political rallies.¹⁰ One of the other major concerns that comes from this technology is the lack of ability to audit the data. Because many of the concerning use cases can be applied from a variety of directions. Sometimes, it is Flock misusing or misrepresenting how they are using the technology, sometimes it is a city misusing their own ALPR cameras and sometimes, the misuse comes from entities outside of the city’s jurisdiction entirely that have access to the network of cameras and because of this fractured web of access and auditability, that leads to a general lack of transparency. Even if a local police department really wanted to lock down and track who has all of the access to their ALPR cameras, Flock has made this almost impossible to do thanks to their facilitation of back door, side door and even front door access to their cameras and the data that is scraped and collected from them.¹¹
This side door and back door access has also been extended to federal agencies such as the DHS, Conservation Police, and other agencies for the purposes of facilitating immigration raids despite Flock claiming that it "holds no contracts" with entities like ICE.¹² Flock, instead of signing contracts with these federal agencies or private companies, will instead skirt accountability and form "partnerships" with these entities. States have at times forced local police departments to give federal agents access to their Flock network of cameras, which can extend access to thousands of cameras across the country well beyond the jurisdiction of the surveilling entity. Reporting has documented federal immigration agents accessing school security cameras through Flock-connected systems, a use case no local school district or city policy contemplated when the cameras were initially installed.¹³ Concerns about this kind of cross-jurisdictional access have prompted multiple cities across the country to cancel or decline to renew their Flock contracts, reporting in 2025 that immigration-enforcement concerns have been a primary driver of that movement.¹⁴ One earlier proposed Flock partnership would have linked the company's nationwide lookup network with Amazon's Ring camera system. Public backlash quashed that arrangement, but the proposal itself illustrates the trajectory of the platform.
That doesn’t even touch on the security issues with Flock cameras as well. The security of the cameras themselves is so poor that they are easily hacked, in some cases hackers are able to gain full access to the camera feed in as little as 30 seconds.¹⁵ There have also been a number of hacks that have led to the feeds of Flock cameras to be publicly accessible on the open internet for weeks at a time. Anyone with a link to the feed could scour through thousands of feeds from traffic intersections to playgrounds.¹⁶
One of the major areas of misuse that we have seen over the last handful of years has been flagrant misuse of ALPR cameras by law enforcement officers themselves. These abuses range from stalking ex-partners¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ to using the cameras for things like searching for a woman who left the state of Texas after receiving an abortion.²⁰ Despite claims from Flock that they perform audits of all searches on their platforms while searching for misuse or security concerns, “Significantly, unlike all its major competitors in the ALPR market, Flock has refused to allow independent security analysts to test its devices to ensure that claims made by the company are accurate.”²¹ This lack of accountability tied with the potential for misuse, means that the instances of misuse that we have already observed across the country are not just a possibility, but they are an inevitability. This inevitability is further exacerbated by Flock’s refusal to cooperate with 3rd party entities that could perform audits on their myriad claims about the security and efficacy of the services that they offer. This means that even in the instance where there is a local police department that is on their best behavior acting to hold themselves and their officers accountable, holding records of searches, restricting searches to relevant cases and auditing their own use of ALPR cameras, that misuse at the corporate level from Flock themselves would still lead to gaping security and privacy concerns that go beyond the local community where the cameras are installed.
The most recent and most striking illustration of how vendor-level access can produce concerns local policy never anticipated comes from Dunwoody, Georgia. Reporting in April 2026 documented that Flock employees had been accessing the city's networked cameras as part of sales demonstrations for prospective customers, including cameras at a Jewish community center, a children's gymnastics room, a swimming pool, and a school. Flock confirmed that the access took place under what the company called a "demo partner agreement" with the city, and the company's CEO issued a personal apology to the Jewish community center after a local resident discovered the access through a public records request.²² What's most significant about the Dunwoody case for understanding the platform-level concern is what it reveals about the gap between contract language and operational reality. Flock's public materials state that "Flock customers own their data" and that "nobody from Flock Safety is accessing or monitoring your footage." In Dunwoody, both claims turned out to require qualification once specific facts came to light. The city had granted access for product testing and demonstrations through an agreement most residents knew nothing about, and that access included cameras in places residents would never have authorized had they been asked. After the public revelation and three hours of resident testimony at a council meeting, Dunwoody voted to renew its Flock contract anyway.
City of Rock Island
I would like to state clearly upfront that my criticisms with Flock cameras and ALPR cameras more broadly do not extend to direct criticism of the Rock Island Police Department or the City of Rock Island more generally. I believe that the Rock Island Police Department has done their best to try to institute many best practices and procedures to head-off many of the potential vectors of misuse from Rock Island Police Department personnel such as using the cameras for stalking or for vague reasons not tied to active investigations. This being said, there is only so much that our police department can do to head-off the misuse cases that have been seen from Flock Safety themselves. That is where the majority of my concerns lie.
Due, in part to Flock’s violations of Illinois state privacy law²³ and the repeated usage violations from Flock Safety that I have mentioned previously in this piece, our city has restricted access to our Flock ALPR cameras to partner police departments around the Quad Cities such as Silvis, Moline, East Moline, Milan, Eldridge, Rock Island County, Davenport, Bettendorf, and Coal Valley. Due to the aforementioned violations, my understanding is that there are further restrictions on access to the cameras for the Quad Cities police departments on the Iowa side of the river where the Rock Island Police Department has disabled the Flock National Lookup feature for all out of state and Federal agencies, with the exception of Davenport, Bettendorf, and Eldridge police departments.
The Rock Island Police Department has chosen to install their 21 cameras around the perimeter of Rock Island, tracking vehicles that are entering or leaving the city. This practice is one that I think is both admirable and fair compared to what we have seen in some cities that have concentrated cameras in certain areas of their city or have even focused on recording places of worship, schools and health care facilities.²⁴
“ALPR vendor Flock Safety will store data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. Flock Safety will purge their data at the end of thirty (30) days of storage”²⁵This is the formal policy between the city of Rock Island and Flock Safety in regards to the data that is stored on the Flock cams themselves such as the footage, images, searches and all other data that is stored on the device by the Rock Island Police Department. That, unfortunately does not encapsulate all of the data that is taken, stored and used by Flock
²⁶
This aggregated data collection and analysis is standard among many algorithmic or AI companies. Many readers might recall coming across this verbiage if you have ever read through the terms of use of any modern social media platform or AI tool. This section gives companies like Flock the right to use the data scraped from their algorithmic systems to create parallel programs, improve existing programs and covers liability in the case that there is a data breach.
If there is data collected somewhere, there is risk for that data to be compromised or used for nefarious purposes. If data is collected and then consolidated at a central point without oversight, it will be used in ways that harm the individuals whose data has been collected. That goes for Flock, data held by the Rock Island Police Department and data held by entities like your bank, social media sites and myriad other vectors for data collection. My concerns are not based out of a naive belief that our privacy can be completely secured, but it is based out of a desire for security.
There are also restrictions around what searches a Rock Island Police Department officer can conduct. All searches of license plates must be tied to a case number for a cause. This might seem like a no-brainer but it is far from the norm for police departments and it is a commendable step that the city of Rock Island has taken to ensure that there are no cases of misuse like we have seen in other cities. The log of searches conducted by officers also goes through a regular auditing process to ensure that there is no impropriety going on from the officers themselves.
There are layers of protections here around the use of ALPR cameras by our city employees. The location of the cameras, the audited logs that must be tied to case numbers and the 30 day deletion window all serve as practices that attempt to keep our data safe from misuse by city employees. These restrictions, unfortunately do not extend to that aggregated data collection being conducted by Flock Safety themselves.
Conclusion
The picture I have tried to draw in this article is one in which the Rock Island Police Department has made meaningful, deliberate choices about how it operates the Flock Safety system and I believe the council and Chief McCloud specifically deserve commendation for that. But I also want to highlight that those choices, however responsible, can only address part of the concern. The cameras are placed around the city's perimeter, not aimed at schools or churches or healthcare facilities. Officers must tie searches to case numbers and document a reason. Searches are audited. Data is purged after thirty days. Access by out-of-state and federal agencies has been restricted. Illinois state law forbids the use of these systems for immigration or reproductive healthcare investigations.
Many other cities and communities, even within the Quad Cities, have not taken such measures.
What none of it can address is the vendor. The cameras themselves, the software running on them, the network they're connected to, the products being developed on top of the data they collect, the security of the company's own infrastructure, the access granted to outside parties at the platform level, all of this is decided by Flock Safety, not by the City of Rock Island. The concerns this article has outlined; Nova, among other Flock tools, and the shift toward person-based tracking, the documented security failures and the federal regulatory scrutiny that has followed, the cross-jurisdictional access being used in ways state law in Illinois cannot prevent, the documented pattern of officer-level and corporate-level misuse across the Flock network, and most recently the revelation that Flock employees have been accessing cameras in sensitive locations as sales demonstrations in cities that contract with the company, are not concerns Rock Island's policy can reach. These are concerns about the platform itself, and they will not be fixed by a stricter local policy because no local policy applies to them.
This is, ultimately, a debate about a tradeoff. ALPR systems can help solve crimes, and the Rock Island Police Department has cited specific cases where the technology has been useful. The question is whether those benefits are worth the cost of participating in a vendor-controlled surveillance platform whose trajectory, security, and broader uses are increasingly outside the City's ability to govern. Reasonable people will weigh that tradeoff differently. Some Rock Islanders may conclude, having considered all of this, that the public-safety benefits justify the participation. Others may conclude that the platform-level concerns outweigh those benefits. Both conclusions are legitimate. What is not legitimate is making the decision without the public weighing in.
Rock Island's contract with Flock Safety will be coming up for renewal in the near future. The City of Rock Island has even been making moves to expand functionality of their ALPR cameras on a trial basis to include audio recording.²⁷ When it does, the decision should be made through a transparent public process of engaged public comment, discussion and feedback. A real conversation between residents and the elected officials who represent them. That conversation is more likely to happen, and more likely to be substantive, if council members hear from the people they represent.
If you have read this far and the concerns described in this piece resonate with you, the most useful thing you can do is contact your alderperson and Mayor Harris and tell them so. Clearly, and respectfully. The point is not which side you land on. The point is that the council should hear from residents on both sides, in numbers, well before the renewal date arrives. One of the reasons elected officials sometimes assume residents don't care about an issue is that they don't hear from residents about it. That assumption shapes how decisions get made, and it can be corrected only by residents making themselves heard.
You can find your alderperson and their contact information on the City of Rock Island's website at rigov.org. Public comment is also welcomed at every City Council meeting, which are open to the public and held regularly at City Hall. Whatever your view, this is a decision worth participating in.
Thank you for reading.
Atticus Garrison
Further Reading Recommendations (With Rock Island Public Library Links!):
Merchant, Brian. Blood in the Machine : The Origins of the Rebellion against Big Tech. Little, Brown and Company, 2023.
Payton, Theresa. Privacy in the Age of Big Data : Recognizing Threats, Defending Your Rights, and Protecting Your Family. Second edition, Rowman & Littlefield, 2023.
Wills, Jocelyn. Tug of War : Surveillance Capitalism, Military Contracting, and the Rise of the Security State. McGill-Queen’s University Press, [2017], 2017.
Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. PublicAffairs, [2019], 2019.
Sources Referenced:
¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “Automatic License Plate Readers.” Science and Technology. Accessed April 1, 2026. https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/automatic-license-plate-readers.
² Stanley, Jay. “Machine Surveillance Is Being Super-Charged by Large AI Models.” American Civil Liberties Union, March 21, 2025. https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/machine-surveillance-is-being-super-charged-by-large-ai-models.
⁴ Cox, Joseph. “ICE, Secret Service, Navy All Had Access to Flock’s Nationwide Network of Cameras.” 404 Media, October 16, 2025. https://www.404media.co/ice-secret-service-navy-all-had-access-to-flocks-nationwide-network-of-cameras/.
⁵ Cox, Joseph. “License Plate Reader Company Flock Is Building a Massive People Lookup Tool, Leak Shows.” 404 Media, May 14, 2025. https://www.404media.co/license-plate-reader-company-flock-is-building-a-massive-people-lookup-tool-leak-shows/.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Murray, Conor. “U.S. Data Privacy Protection Laws: A Comprehensive Guide.” Forbes, April 21, 2023. https://www.forbes.com/sites/conormurray/2023/04/21/us-data-privacy-protection-laws-a-comprehensive-guide/.
⁸ Barrett, Devlin. “Gun-Show Customers’ License Plates Come Under Scrutiny.” Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/gun-show-customers-license-plates-come-under-scrutiny-1475451302.
⁹ Alajaji, Dave Maass and Rindala. “How Cops Are Using Flock Safety’s ALPR Network to Surveil Protesters and Activists.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, November 20, 2025. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/how-cops-are-using-flock-safetys-alpr-network-surveil-protesters-and-activists.
¹⁰ Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Data Driven: What Is ALPR?” November 15, 2018. https://www.eff.org/pages/what-alpr.
¹¹ Stanley, Jay. “Flock Can Share Driver-Surveillance Data Even When Police Departments Opt Out, And Other Flock Developments.” American Civil Liberties Union, October 24, 2025. https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-massachusetts-and-updates.
¹² Koebler, Jason. “Wildlife Conservation Police Are Searching Thousands of Flock Cameras for ICE.” 404 Media, April 6, 2026. https://www.404media.co/floridas-wildlife-cops-are-searching-thousands-of-flock-cameras-for-ice/.
¹³ Keierleber, Mark. “ICE Taps into School Security Cameras to Aid Trump’s Immigration Crackdown.” The 74, February 10, 2026. https://www.the74million.org/article/ice-taps-into-school-security-cameras-to-aid-trumps-immigration-crackdown-74-investigation-shows/.
¹⁴ Joffe-Block, Jude. “Why Some Cities Are Ditching Their Flock License Plate Readers.” National. NPR, February 19, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/02/17/nx-s1-5612825/flock-contracts-canceled-immigration-survillance-concerns.
¹⁶ Hofer, Jonathan. “Vulnerability in Flock Condor Cameras Lets Anyone Spy on the Public .” Independent Institute, January 14, 2026. https://www.independent.org/article/2026/01/14/flock-condor-camera-spy-public/.
¹⁷ Holmes, Isiah. “Wisconsin Communities Grapple with Police Misuse of Flock Surveillance.” Wisconsin Examiner, March 13, 2026. https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2026/03/13/wisconsin-communities-grapple-with-police-misuse-of-flock-surveillance/.
¹⁸ Staff, WCTV. “Former Echols County Sheriff’s Office Employee Arrested for Allegedly Accessing FLOCK Data, Stalking.” Https://Www.Wctv.Tv, January 7, 2026. https://www.wctv.tv/2026/01/07/former-echols-county-sheriffs-office-employee-arrested-allegedly-accessing-flock-data-stalking/.
¹⁹ Chun, Max. “Georgia Police Chief, Arrested for Using Flock Cameras for Stalking and Harassment, Searched Capitola Data Earlier This Year.” Lookout Santa Cruz, December 3, 2025. https://lookout.co/georgia-police-chief-arrested-for-using-flock-cameras-for-stalking-and-harassment-searched-capitola-data-earlier-this-year/story.
²⁰ Alajaji, Dave Maass and Rindala. “Flock Safety and Texas Sheriff Claimed License Plate Search Was for a Missing Person. It Was an Abortion Investigation.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 7, 2025. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flock-safety-and-texas-sheriff-claimed-license-plate-search-was-missing-person-it.
²¹ Center for Human Rights. “Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock Surveillance Systems Expose Washington Data to Immigration Enforcement.” University of Washington, October 21, 2025. https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2025/10/21/leaving-the-door-wide-open/.
²² Koebler, Jason. “City Learns Flock Accessed Cameras in Children’s Gymnastics Room as a Sales Pitch Demo, Renews Contract Anyway.” 404 Media, April 30, 2026. https://www.404media.co/city-learns-flock-accessed-cameras-in-childrens-gymnastics-room-as-a-sales-pitch-demo-renews-contract-anyway/.
²³ “Giannoulias’ Audit Finds License Plate Reader Company in Violation of State Law .” Illinois Secretary of State, Office of the Secretary of State Illinois, 25 Aug. 2025, https://www.ilsos.gov/news/2025/august-25-2025-giannoulias-audit-finds-license-plate-reader-company-in-violation-of-state-law.html.
²⁴ Source ONE News Staff. “Moses Lake Police Adjust License Plate Reader Program under New Washington Privacy Law.” Source ONE News, 7 Apr. 2026, https://www.yoursourceone.com/columbia_basin/moses-lake-police-adjust-license-plate-reader-program-under-new-washington-privacy-law/article_e269eb47-cf25-4745-8c60-0d28014059be.html.
²⁵ Page 3 of ALPR Rock Island Police Department Handbook
²⁶ Section 4.5 of ALPR Rock Island Police Dept Flock Agreement
²⁷ Reichardt , Nora. “Rock Island Approves Audio Gunshot Detection Pilot Program.” Wqad.Com, WQAD, April 13, 2026. https://www.wqad.com/article/news/local/public-safety/rock-island-audio-gunshot-detection-pilot-program-raven-flock/526-bf3e48bd-2eb3-42ec-8398-41697c9d33aa.